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Abstract 
 
We model an investment in a foreign subsidiary, the outside finance to which is injected by 
its parent company from abroad. Sinn’s (1993) initial “underinvestment” problem due to 
taxes on repatriated dividends is argued to also concern all follow-up investments of the 
subsidiary financed from its marginal profits that represent the required return on the initial 
investment. The dividend tax capitalization hypothesis in the international context, or the 
Sinn-Hartman neutrality theorem, is valid only if the initial investment generates intra-
marginal profits and concerns their reinvestment, the returns of which are repatriated 
dividends.  
 
The results reveal that the ownership structure of the parent and the consequent tax 
preference for dividends affect foreign source intra-marginal profits differently from 
domestic source ones. In particular, the cost of capital for foreign intra-marginal profits is 
inversely affected by the home-country dividend tax.  
 
We calibrate the cost of capital formulae to the parameter values of the Estonian and 
Finnish systems of taxing international investment income. The calculations show that the 
Estonian subsidiaries, paying no tax on undistributed profits but a corporate dividend tax, 
offer tax benefits to their parent companies only by their intra-marginal profits.  
 
 
JEL codes: H25, H32, H87
1. Introduction 
Tax havens attract funds because of their low or non-existent accrual-based taxes on 
income from capital, but usually have no productive investment opportunities inside their 
own jurisdictions.  The funds under management in a tax haven must ultimately be 
invested outside its borders. Source-based taxation of accruing income from productive 
activities would thus guarantee the same effective level of taxation in the world whether 
claims on such activities are owned directly by non-taxed institutions as pension funds or 
by tax-paying residents via their investment vehicles in tax havens; see Kari and Ylä-
Liedenpohja (2002) for a recent discussion. 
 
Estonia is different. She has a rapidly developing economy with growing investment 
opportunities in productive capital, but no corporation tax on undistributed profits. Only 
distributions are taxed at a rate of 26 per cent on pre-tax profit or 26/74 = 0.3514 on post-
corporation tax dividend. The same tax rate applies to all income, monetary or in-kind, 
running from the corporate to the household sphere. Repatriations of realization gains on 
Estonian business assets of which real estate comprises at least 75 per cent in book value 
terms are regarded as distributions and are taxed accordingly in Estonia. 
 
The Estonian approach to tax corporations may be viewed as a tax holiday without a 
definite length in contrast to the well known Irish case and the experiments by the Central-
East European countries. The incentive effects of the Estonian application seem, however, 
different from those of a typical tax holiday arrangement. The investment in Estonia 
benefits primarily from the deferral of the tax payment, without offering tax shields in the 
form of interest deductibility or accelerated tax depreciation allowances. Repatriation of 
Estonian-source income become relevant only after the multinational has exhausted 
investment opportunities therein. The shares of an Estonian subsidiary may change 
ownership. The initial owner may thus “repatriate” the accrued capital in the country where 
the legal ownership of the subsidiary lies without any effect on the investment incentives in 
Estonia.  How such a deferral period is taken into account when applying the standard cost 
of capital approach is one of the main motivations for this study. 
 
Corporation tax is eventually paid at a regular rate in a traditional fixed length tax holiday, 
implying no effect on the steady-state cost of capital. Even the temporary incentive effects  
of the tax holiday itself may be nullified if the parent company is in the country that credits 
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foreign taxes against the domestic tax on foreign-source income, implying that foreign 
income will in the end be taxed in the home country and that tax holiday only shifts tax 
revenue from the foreign country (f-country) to the home one; see Mintz and Tsiopoulos 
(1994) for a thorough analysis on the issues. If the home country (h-country) of the parent 
company exempts foreign-source income from the domestic tax, tax holiday arrangements 
may encourage migrant industries to settle only for the period of tax holiday, which the 
Estonian system avoids. 
 
Popular debate often labels Estonia as a tax haven1 because savings grow untaxed within 
its business sector. We scrutinize this claim more closely within the standard trapped 
equity approach of applied tax theory, extended to the multinational framework. The key of 
the trapped equity argument is the capitalization of all dividend taxes in the share price at 
the moment of retaining and investing one euro of post-corporation tax profit. Therefore, 
dividend taxes are unavoidable. They are paid whether profits are distributed or retained.  
 
In the case of repatriation of income from Estonia, the “dividend tax” contains (i) the 
Estonian corporation tax on distributions in the Estonian subsidiary2, (ii) any repatriation 
tax in the form of the parent company tax exceeding the Estonian corporation tax in a 
country applying the credit method to taxation of foreign-source income,  (iii) equalization 
tax on onward distributed foreign-source income in a country applying exemption to 
foreign-source income, but having the imputation system, and (iv) the shareholders’ 
dividend tax differential (including possible imputation credits) compared to their effective 
capital gains tax rate. Equalization tax guarantees that any home-country destination 
dividends are taxed in the home country at the same rate as the rate of imputation. 3
 
This approach makes it possible to value consistently the opportunity cost of profits 
generated in the home country of the parent and in the host countries of its foreign 
                                                 
1 According to the IMF 2004 country report, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP varied between 30.7 and 32.9 
per cent in 1999-2003, and non-tax revenues of general government between 3.1 and 4.4. per cent. On this 
count Estonia hardly classifies a tax haven. 
2 In case of portfolio dividends an additional withholding tax is levied by Estonia as allowed by the bilateral 
tax treaties.  
3 Equalization tax is, however, different from other dividend taxes because it is avoidable by the parent 
company, by transforming foreign profits via home-country investments or via transfer pricing into home-
country taxed profits which are distributable without equalization tax  (Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja 2005). 
Equalization tax may thus change the parent’s investment incentives while not affecting those of its f-country 
subsidiary. 
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subsidiaries, but repatriated to the home-country and used to finance investment projects 
in Estonia in addition to profits generated therein. Next section presents the no-profit 
arbitrage condition for cross-border real investment, the basis of the derivation of the cost 
of capital formulae in section 3 and their numerical illustrations in section 5.  
 
Our modelling is general and applicable to any country hosting subsidiaries the outside 
financing of which relies on funding from abroad. The analysis emphasizes the initial entry 
investment, whether tax factors affect its desirability over staying at home. The reference 
profitability is the same post-parent corporation tax level for both the entry investment and 
the home country investment as determined by arbitrage in the international financial 
markets. Our approach is related to Sinn’s (1993). He studies an explicit dynamic model 
that assumes the investment opportunities to be given at the time of entry investment, and 
finds the parent to underinvest in the subsidiary due to the tax on repatriated dividends. 
We stay within the static framework, but assume ad hoc new investment opportunities to 
emerge along the passage of time. 
 
Section 3 starts from the problem how the deferral of profit repatriations is taken into 
account when implementing standard cost of capital formulae for the f-country investment, 
separating the f-country investment from marginal and intra-marginal profits therein. The 
implications of the latter distinction for the validity of the trapped equity argument are 
briefly spelled in section 4. Section 5 contains numerical illustrations on the deferral benefit 
of the zero tax on undistributed profits in Estonia compared to equivalent projects in the 
home country of the multinational. 
 
In the calculations we assume the parent companies to be either listed or non-listed 
(closely-held). Dividends distributed by the former are regarded as income from capital 
and are taxed at a flat rate. Dividends from the latter are divided by a splitting rule to a 
maximum amount that is taxed as income from capital at a flat rate and to earned income 
that is taxed at progressive marginal rates. This is the so-called Nordic dual income tax 
analysed by Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg (2002) and by Kari (1999) in the Finnish case. 
In the end, we shall consider four different ownership structures of the parent companies. 
The home country is assumed either to exempt or to apply the credit method to foreign-
source income in the taxation of parent companies. The ownership structures cover both 
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classical corporation tax and the imputation system with an equalization tax as alternative 
means of taxing domestic-destination dividends.  
 
Section 6 summarises the results. The ownership structure of the parent and the 
consequent tax preference for dividends is shown to affect foreign source intra-marginal 
profits differently from domestic source ones. In particular, the cost of capital for foreign 
intra-marginal profits is inversely affected by the home-country dividend tax.  Our analysis 
does not support the view of Estonia as a tax haven for investment funds originating 
outside Estonia. The Estonian subsidiaries offer tax benefits to their parent companies 
only by their intra-marginal profits. No other clear deferral benefits are found as is the 
standard thinking of realization based taxation of capital gains. 
 
 
2. Investment arbitrage 
Consider an investment by the parent company in its corporate foreign subsidiary. Such an 
investment must, at the margin, earn a pre-tax real rate of return MRRf that covers all the 
taxes from the f-country corporation tax, the repatriation phase tax from the subsidiary to 
the parent, the possible tax of the onward distribution phase and the parent’s equity- and 
bondholders’ taxes so that the investors are at least as well off as investing the opportunity 
cost of the funds on their own account: 
 
(1)   ii
ff
jji MRR γρπτδθ =+−− ))(1)(1(ˆ
 
where 
γi                  = the opportunity value of the investors’ funds of type i at the parent’s disposal  
ρi                   = the pre-tax nominal, risk-adjusted rate of return earned by the investors on the 
funds of type i in financial markets  
π                  = the f-country rate of inflation  
τ               fj = the f-country rate of corporation tax on income of type j 
δj                  = the combined rate of the f- and h-country taxes on repatriated income of type j 
iθˆ                = the pre-tax income of type i to the investors resulting from a euro of post-
parent company taxes, including the effect of the possible equalization tax 
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 The type i funds fall into four categories: the proceeds from either a) new share issues or 
b) bond issues by the parent, both of which have γ = 1, and the accumulated, undistributed 
c) domestic or d) foreign-source profits, the opportunity cost of which may differ from γ = 1  
due to the effective differential dividend tax over the capital gains tax rate according to the 
tax capitalization view.4
  
The parent’s funds can be invested in the f-country either in the form of outside equity or 
debt. The type j income earned in the f-country is thus either profits on equity or interest5 
on debt, j = b. Profits can be repatriated as dividends, j=d, or retained and invested in the 
f-country, j=R. The latter entails an opportunity value γ f, different from the one of the h-
country source profits γ h due to repatriation taxes. The parent can also sell its f-country 
subsidiary and by that means “repatriate” the f-country undistributed profits in the country 
of legal ownership of the f-subsidiary. 
 
Expression (1) is general enough to include the case where the parent invests in the home 
country, with superscript f replaced by h and with δj equal to zero. Expression (1) can also 
be expanded to include the possibility that a third country  (t-country) is the source of the 
investible funds  as well as the ownership country of the subsidiary, with respective γ t 
adjusted to accordingly reflect the repatriation tax from the t- to the h-country; see Kari and 
Ylä-Liedenpohja (2003) for details.  
 
We depart in (1) from the standard public finance approach for cost of capital in two 
respects. First, relation (1) is defined in terms of post-corporation tax, but pre-investor level 
taxes.  Second, an adjustment for risk is made in ρi, the risk premium for equity being 
different from debt. Our assumption is that ρi is the world market return in arbitrage 
equilibrium. This corresponds to the r-equilibrium in the King-Fullerton (1984) (KF) jargon. 
We adopt the corporate finance approach that such a rate of return is determined and 
                                                 
4 Arbitrage equilibrium between dividend income and capital gains implies for the opportunity cost of h-
country retained profits is =hγ )1/()1( gd ττ −−  where dτ is the rate of dividend tax and gτ   the rate of 
capital gains tax of a representative investor. 
5 If interest expenses are deductible, =0 holds, and if they are not, equals the statutory τ fbτ fbτ f .  
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observed by the class of claims, equity and debt. In the KF-literature, the r-equilibrium is 
assumed to take place in arbitrage via real projects.  
 
The derivation of the standard cost of capital formulae from (1) implies that all tax rates are 
accrual-based. The most straightforward is the effective tax rate of interest income. If the 
subsidiary is financed by debt from the parent, its interest income is repatriated and taxed 
every year at the corporation tax rate of the parent. It is a tax on nominal interest income 
which raises the effective tax rate on real interest income above the legal one. Such an 
effective tax rate, δb in the notation of condition (1), is the ratio of the tax on nominal 
interest income to the real interest income repatriated, and condition (1) obtains the form  
 
(2)  hE
f
bd MRR γρπδθ =+− ))(1(ˆ
 
where the source of funds is assumed to be the domestically taxed profits of the parent, 
valued at γ h by the market, and where subscript d stands for dividends, and E  for equity. 
Thus ρΕ  is the required rate of return on equity. The cost of capital  is then directly 
solved from (2), where subscript D stands for debt financing. This gives a benchmark cost 
of capital for the subsidiary without the parent benefitting from the deferral of foreign profit 
repatriations or being penalized by taxes on cumulative inflation-caused gains. 
f
DMRR
 
 
3. Marginal and intra-marginal profits 
The trapped equity approach to the arbitrage condition (1) assumes that the post-
corporation tax profits of the mature foreign subsidiary will be repatriated as a continuous 
dividend stream up to the eternal future. Because of emerging investment opportunities 
and non-taxed undistributed profits in Estonia, the parent company may find it 
advantageous to reinvest the profits therein. Dividend payments are therefore deferred 
until the parent starts to repatriate them. The deferral period is taken into account by 
compounding the required dividend stream at the rate Eρ  to a future date6 n, when 
dividend repatriations are assumed to start. Thus the deferral of dividend repatriation 
increases the size of the future dividend stream on the marginal entry investment at time 
                                                 
6 In a full model date n is optimized subject to the profitability of the future investment opportunities. 
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t=0 due to the reinvestment of its profits. During this period the investors earn capital gains 
from the entry investment, at the rate ρΕ , the cost of equity injected by the parent.7
 
Specifically, let us assume that the subsidiary has exhausted its investment opportunities 
at date n and thereafter sends its whole real profit to the parent. Define  
A   =   the cost of an asset acquired with the initial equity injection at date 0, and  
g    =   the average rate of real post-tax profits retained and reinvested at source. 
The book value of the asset then grows at the average nominal rate of (g+π ), where π  is 
the average rate of f-country inflation, having a value of   at time t. The remitted, 
real post-corporation tax profit at time n will be gAe
tgAe )( π+
(g+π)n . But, part of this dividend stream 
is due to the initial equity A to the f-country from the h-country taxed profits. Their 
opportunity cost to the investors is γhA. Repatriation taxes on such dividends, in the lhs of 
the arbitrage condition (1), do not reflect in γ h and therefore do not cancel out.  
 
Hence, such a dividend stream at date n must satisfy from (1) the following, required real 
rate of return ρE-p on the compounded nominal equity, with p standing for the rate of world 
inflation 
 
(3)      nhE
ngf
dd
EAepgAe ρπ γρτθ )()1(ˆ )( −=− +
 
It can be solved for g=gA* and further for the cost of capital MRRAf  from condition (A1)8 of 
Appendix, with subscript A standing for the initial equity injection. The real rate of asset 
growth gA* of the entry investment due to the follow-up investments of the f-country post-
corporation tax profits thus gives the minimum that satisfies the real rate of return in the 
financial market. 
 
Also, we conclude from (3) that repatriation taxes affect whether  is less than 
one and that any reinvestment of the f-country post-tax profits that represent the required 
return on the initial entry investment do not belong to the sphere of the international 
)1(ˆ fdd τθ −
                                                 
7 This is a general property of dynamic investment models in which the investors earn their return as capital 
gains during the growth period with no dividend pay-outs until profitability starts to constrain growth when 
profits are used both for distributions and investments (Ylä-Liedenpohja 1978). 
8 The proper rate of corporation tax is now  in (A1). fdτ
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trapped equity argument. The repatriation taxes on such profits drive up the pre-tax cost of 
capital for the initial investment. Thus the initial “underinvestment” due to the repatriation 
taxes (Sinn 1993) concerns also the cost of capital of all follow-up investments which are 
financed from the post-tax profits, representing the required return on the initial equity. 
 
Only if the real asset growth g exceeds the required gA*, that is, the initial investment is 
value creating and generates cash flows in excess of a zero net present value project, the 
standard tax capitalization hypothesis applies. The opportunity cost of each euro of intra-
marginal profits reinvested in the f-country is γ f   in (1). The repatriation taxes on such 
post-tax f-profits capitalize into their market value γ f  when reinvested in the f-country as 
was originally observed by Sinn (1984) and Hartman (1985). That is, the following holds  
 
(4)  hfdd
f γτθγ )1(ˆ −=
 
Thus the repatriation tax component cancels out in (1), and we are left from (1) with a 
standard cost of capital  
 
(5) πτ
γρ −−= f
h
Ef
RMRR 1
 
 
where subscript R stands for retained  and reinvested intra-marginal profit.9 This form of 
the cost of capital for intra-marginal retained f-country profits shows that, though we are 
explicitly in the tax capitalization framework, the h-country dividend tax affects the pre-tax 
cost of capital of such foreign funds an thus extends the Sinn-Hartman neutrality theorem. 
The company can estimate from stock market data Eρ , the required rate of return on its 
shares, as well as , the financial markets’ tax preference for its dividends,hγ 10 the latter 
                                                 
9 In the Estonian case holds naturally. Though in a unconventional form, formula (5) is a standard 
one indeed. Remember that 
0=fτ
Eρ  is defined as the required, nominal pre-personal tax rate of return on equity. 
If r is the corresponding post-tax rate of return, Eρ  = r/ )1( dτ−  holds where dτ is the rate of dividend tax. 
Because the dividend tax is also deducted from the opportunity cost of the invested funds, i.e. 
=hγ )1/()1( gd ττ −−  where gτ  is the rate of capital gains tax, dividend tax cancel out and the conventional 
form obtains. πττ −−−= )1)(1/( fgR rMRR
10 Financial economics has taught the estimation of these two parameters for almost four decades. 
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being affected by dividend tax. Formula (5) implies that, everything else given, the higher 
is the opportunity cost of retained h-country intra-marginal profits, γ h , meaning the lower 
is the owners’ dividend tax rate, the higher is the pre-tax cost of capital for intra-marginal 
retained profits  in the f-country subsidiary of the multinational. fRMRR
 
Let us finally consider the problem when the parent company sells its f-country subsidiary 
when it reaches a mature state at date n.  The subsidiary has generated post-tax profits at 
the real rate of g. Therefore, its remitted future real dividend stream, net of the repatriation 
taxes, capitalized at the real discount rate (ρE-p), is the sum that the buyer is willing to pay 
for its shares, or 
 
(6) 
p
gAe
E
ngf
dd
−
− +
ρ
τθ π )()1(ˆ  
 
The seller’s reservation price S before corporation tax11 is determined by 
 
(7)        ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−++=−− ∫ −−+ )1()()(
0
))(()( nh
n
tnptgfnhh EEE eAdteeAgAeASS ρρπρ γπγγτ
      
where the lhs is the post-h-country-corporation tax realization price. The first term on the 
rhs is the value of the initial f-country equity to the owners compounded at their required 
rate of return, that is, including the reinvested marginal profits. The second term is the 
accumulated intra-marginal profits in the f-country up to date n and valued at γ f, that is, the 
required real return on all nominal profits reinvested minus the reinvested marginal profits. 
Carrying out the integration and solving for S, we obtain 
 
(8) [ ]
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −+−+−+
++−−=
−+ Aee
pg
AgAeS hhfnpng
E
fnhf
h
EE )()()1(
1
1 )()( τγγρπ
πγγγτ
ρπρ  
 
Hence condition (8) must equal (6) in equilibrium for the trade sale to occur. Collecting all 
terms containing g to the lhs, we obtain 
                                                 
11 Below we carry out calculations also on the assumption that realization gains from the shares of the 
subsidiary are tax exempt, i.e. τh=0 holds true in (7).  
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 (9)     [ ] =
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −+−+
+
−−−
− −++ npng
E
f
h
E
ngf
dd Eee
pg
Ag
p
gAe )()(
)( )(
1
1)1(ˆ ρπ
π
ρπ
πγτρ
τθ  
{ }AAe hhfnhfh E )()1(1 1 τγγγγτ ρ −+−−   
 
This can be solved for g = gS* and further from (A1) for MRRS* to give the required real 
asset growth and the required pre-tax real rate of return on assets in the f-country in the 
case  the profits from the initial investment are “repatriated” by realizing the shares of the 
subsidiary in a trade sale, subscript S standing for trade sale.  
 
 
4. Implications for interpretations 
Figure 1 illustrates our approach. An expanding economy implies a gradual shifting of the 
investment opportunity schedule, i.e. Keynes’s marginal efficiency of investment, over time 
from the initial position at time t=0 to the steady-state one . The subsidiary 
invests initially up to  and in the steady-state up to  because of the lower opportunity 
cost of intra-marginal profits  due to the capitalization of dividend tax.  
AMRR nMRR
*
AK
*
nK
1<hγ
 
---   Insert Figure 1 approx. here    --- 
 
The approach has a number of implications for the tax capitalization hypothesis. The first 
concerns interpreting empirical evidence. The well-known studies of Poterba and 
Summers (1983,1985) lend support to the traditional view of corporation finance and 
taxation. Investors value a profit dollar in the tills of a corporation equal to the one in their 
pockets and, therefore, the marginal source of investment finance is the proceeds from 
new share issues. If the major fraction of profits earned and reinvested are in fact marginal 
rather than intra-marginal, the evidence tilts naturally in favour of the traditional view in 
contrast the tax capitalization one. The distinction between intra-marginal and marginal 
profits may reconcile the results of Auerbach and Hasset (2003), who find the marginal 
source of investment funds of mature companies to be retained profits, in respect of 
Poterba and Summers (1983, 1985). 
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By the same argument, one should also weigh the double-tax cost of capital not only with 
the share of new share issues, but also with the share of reinvested marginal profits12 to 
get a King-Fullerton (1984) kind of overall tax wedge of marginal investment in an 
economy.  
 
The final implication concerns tax policy. The tax capitalization view, according to which 
dividend tax is not relevant for investment decisions because it is deducted in the 
opportunity cost of reinvested profits as well as in the net returns of such investments, may 
have much less relevance for the cost of capital of mature companies13 since the profits 
retained and reinvested by such companies tend principally to be marginal ones, enough 
to satisfy the required rate of return on investors’ equity injections. 
 
 
5. Numerical illustrations for the case of Estonia 
The key parameters are those contained in (1), the world capital market equilibrium 
condition. The recent estimate of Dimson et al. (2002) for the real geometric average rate 
of return on the U.S. equities is 6.7 per cent per annum. We adopt it as a world market 
equilibrium rate of return. It also fulfils the often cited rule of thumb that the price/earnings 
multiple PE=15 holds true in the long run equilibrium. An asset yielding 0.067 EUR per 
year in perpetuity is valued at 1 EUR in the financial markets. Adding two percentage 
points as an equilibrium rate of inflation to it, the following parameter values are used: 
 
ρE-p = 0.067 = the required real rate of return on equity     
p = 0.02 = the world rate of inflation 
Eρ  = 0.087 = the required nominal rate of return on equity 
π  = 0.025 = the rate of inflation in the f-country, being higher than p  
     due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
τf = 0 = the f-country rate of corporation taxes on retained     
τdf  = 0.26    and distributed profits  
τh = 0.29 = the h-country rate of corporation tax  
 
                                                 
12 How estimate such a share is of course a research problem per se. 
13 In contrast, Auerbach and Hassett (2003) defend the tax capitalization cost of capital on the basis of their 
finding cited above. 
 12
We assume four different ownership structures14 of the parent company as reflected by 
market valuation of dividends and retained profits. In addition, we differentiate them on the 
basis whether equalization tax is paid or not. Define  = the rate of equalization tax on 
type j income and u = the rate of imputation. Hence, the pre-tax dividend is 
ju
 (1- )/(1-u), when equalization tax is paid and imputation credit is granted, and =θˆ ju
 1/(1-u), when equalization tax is not paid, but imputation credit is granted =θˆ
The cases are: 
 (i)   1 holds true for companies dominated by international == hγθˆ
and domestic tax-exempt institutional investors which are not 
entitled to imputation credits, even if distributions are from taxable 
h-country income, neither is it paid by the distributing company if 
distributions are from tax-exempt f-source income 
(iia)  1.408 holds true for companies owned principally by taxable domestic 
household and corporate investors receiving imputation credits at 
the rate of corporation tax, when distributions are from taxable h-
country income 
== hγθˆ
(iib) 1, 1.408 holds true for the same owners if distributions are from tax-
exempt f-source income, because equalization tax is paid 
=θˆ =hγ
(iii)  1.15 holds true for companies with the average mixture of taxable 
domestic investors and international investors 
== hγθˆ
(iva)   1.408 holds true for closely-held companies owned by domestic =θˆ
        0.95 households the marginal dividends of which are taxed as earned =hγ
       income (Kari 1999, Lindhe et al. 2002)15 when distributions are 
from taxable h-country income 
(ivb) 1,  0.95 holds true for the same owners if distributions are from tax-
exempt f-source income, because equalization tax is paid 
=θˆ =hγ
The cases (i), (iii) and (ivb) are equivalent to a classical system of corporate taxation. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2002) discuss shortly both theoretical models and empirical evidence of how 
different ownership mixes affect valuation of dividends and retained profits in market equilibrium. Case (iii) 
relies on the most recent evidence about the Helsinki Stock Exchange by Vilkman (2002) and corresponds to 
their theoretical values after the Finnish tax reform from 2005 onward. Case (iv) assumes that dividends are 
taxed as earned income at the rate of 0.52, their average marginal tax rate in recent years according to the 
statistics by the National Board of Taxes and that the effective rate of capital gains equals to 0.29 which is 
also the rate of imputation.    
15 The derivation of a benchmark project for this owner category is beyond the scope of this paper due to the 
complexity of the issue. In the case of the subsidiary cost of capital this owner category is more 
straightforwardly analysed because the reinvestment of f-country profits does not increase the net asset 
value of the parent company, the basis of splitting dividends into capital and earned income.   
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The crucial formulae to calculate the required rates of asset growth are (3) for gA and (9) 
for gS*. We notice that  and  enter symmetrically formula (3), but not so formula (9) in 
the case of the f-country subsidiary. 
θˆ hγ
 
First, we calculate the cost of capital for the following benchmark projects (Table 1). The 
first row of Table 1 has 1 in each case (i)-(iii) and clearly shows how the imputation 
system leads to the lowest (pre-corporation tax) cost of outside equity for those companies 
which raise their finance from domestic taxable investors only, because such investors (ii) 
benefit fully from the imputation credit.
=hγ
16 The higher cost of capital for intra-marginal 
profits17 than for new share issues with ownership structures (iia) and (iii) derives from the 
full double taxation of such profits. Yet, there are no differences across the ownership 
structures because of the symmetric effect of  and γ θˆ h on MRRRh according to the tax 
capitalization hypothesis.   
 
Investment in Financed by Inflation 
rate p 
                 Ownership structure 
        (i)                         (iia)                      (iii) 
h-country new share issues  0.02 0.103 0.067 0.087 
h-country intra-m. profits (1) 0.02 0.103 0.103 0.103 
h-country 
h-country 
new share issues 
intra-m. profits (1) 
0 
0 
0.094 
0.094 
0.067 
0.094 
0.082 
          0.094 
 
Table 1. Cost of capital MRRh for benchmark investment projects 
 
 
Second, we derive the required rate of real asset growth and the cost of capital MRRf  for 
the Estonian subsidiary the riskiness of which corresponds to the market average. The 
source of funds by the parent to its subsidiary is thought to be fully taxed domestic profits 
of the parent.  
 
                                                 
16 The entries of the first row are  from formula (1). pMRR hE
h −−= )1(ˆ/ τθρ
17 From (1) the entries of intra-marginal profits are .  pMRR hhE
h
R −−= )1(ˆ/ τθγρ
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The following are the major observations from Tables 2A-C and Table 1. 
 
Ownership categories (i), (iia), (iii): 
a. Injecting the h-country intra-marginal profits as initial equity to the f-country carries over 
one percentage point higher cost of capital MRRAf  than their reinvestment in the h-
country. Extending the initiation of dividend repatriations from 10 to 20 years decreases 
MRRAf  with 0.7 of a percentage point. Those parent companies (iib) that would face 
equalization tax upon onward distribution of the required returns on initial equity stakes 
have a two to three percentage points higher cost of capital. Without equalization tax the 
cost of capital for the initial f-equity and for marginal f-profits MRRAf  is independent of the 
ownership structure as in the case of h-country intra-marginal profits (Table 1). A world 
inflation rate p = 0.02 raises the initial cost of capital MRRAf  in the f-country with 0.7 of a 
percentage point. 
 
b. The f-country cost of capital  for intra-marginal f-profits varies across the 
ownership structure, being the higher the higher is the h-country opportunity cost of intra-
marginal profits (i.e. a higher tax preference for dividends therein and hence having a 
lower h-country cost of capital for funds from new share issues). In case of ownership 
categories (i) and (iii), i.e. classical corporation tax systems, the cost of capital is 
three to four percentage points lower than the cost of capital of such funds for 
reinvestment of in the h-country
f
RMRR
f
RMRR
18 while in case of ownership categories (iia-b), i.e. 
imputation systems,  is only marginally lower than repatriating and reinvesting intra-
marginal f-profits in the h-country though such undistributed profits are not taxed in the 
foreign country. The last thing also implies that world inflation does not affect .  
f
RMRR
f
RMRR
 
c. Investing the parent’s h-country taxed profits in the form of internal group debt to the f-
country and immediately repatriating interest income has an over one and half percentage 
points lower cost of capital  than equity injection MRRfDMRR Af  (and of course a further 
lower one if the risk premium for debt is assumed lower than for equity) though tax is paid 
immediately in the h-country for repatriated interest income. Due to the Balassa-
                                                 
18 Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2003, p.9) argue repatriated intra-marginal foreign profits to have the same cost 
of capital in the h-country as the one of the h-country intra-marginal profits because the payment of the 
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Samuelson effect that represents a real gain to the h-country parent,  is also lower 
than , the cost of capital for the parent’s h-country intra-marginal profits therein.  
f
DMRR
h
RMRR
 
Ownership categories (iva-b):
d. The f-country cost of capital is always the lowest for those closely-held companies 
which would otherwise allocate the funds to dividends taxed as earned income, implying 
the lowest opportunity cost of h-country profits for these companies.   
 
Exit via a trade sale: 
e. Repatriating the f-country profits via the sale of the shares of the mature foreign 
subsidiary (a trade sale) has always a higher cost of capital, rising with the holding 
period19, than the other forms of repatriations if such realization gains are taxed in the h-
country of the parent, but approximately the same cost of capital as group debt to the f-
country if realization gains on controlled foreign companies (CFC’s) are not taxed in the h-
country. In the latter regime, the seller pays tax only via a lower transaction value of the 
trade sale, because the buyer will start paying the corporate dividend tax in the future. 
 
Dividends vs. other forms of repatriations: 
f. As is standard in the tax capitalization framework, it pays always to defer all intra-
marginal foreign profits and to repatriate as dividends the returns on such reinvestments. 
The benefits of deferring and reinvesting marginal profits are minor in the cost of capital, 
being of the same size during a 10 years’ holding period as the inflation-cased increase in 
the cost of capital. Finally, if realization gains on CFC’s are not taxed in the h-country, it 
matters little in respect of the 10 year holding period’s cost of capital whether profit 
repatriation is immediate as interest on debt or deferred as a trade sale of the f-country 
subsidiary.  In fact, extending the holding period increases the cost of capital of the latter. 
Though the starting motivation of our study was to apply the standard thinking of the 
economics of capital gains taxation (Vickrey 1939, Diamond 1975) to analyse the Estonian 
kind of tax holiday, we cannot find an unequivocal benefit from deferred profit repatriations, 
except for intra-marginal foreign profits. The reason is that the cake grows during the 
deferral period at the required rate of return under the assumed arbitrage.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
repatriation phase “dividend tax” accordingly increases the market valuation of such funds (the cost of capital 
side of the international trapped equity argument). 
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 6. Conclusions   
The separate roles of marginal and intra-marginal profit as sources of investment finance 
are faced when analysing the tax holiday offered by the corporate tax system of Estonia. 
Despite a zero rate of corporation tax on undistributed and reinvested profits, part of them 
are marginal reflecting the required rate of return on the initial equity injection from the 
parent to the subsidiary. The reinvestment of marginal profits carries therefore the full 
burden of repatriation taxes, and the initial underinvestment problem of Sinn (1993) also 
concerns all follow-up investments from marginal foreign profits.  
 
The problem does not arise in a standard model of trapped equity in which new issues are 
not modelled and all profits are therefore intra-marginal down to the cost of capital of 
retained profits, given exogenous investment opportunities subject to diminishing marginal 
returns. We allow investment opportunities to expand over time while maintaining the 
assumption of diminishing marginal profitability within any period of time. Therefore, the 
Sinn-Hartman neutrality theorem holds true only in the case of intra-marginal profits. 
 
An implication of the trapped equity tax capitalization hypothesis is that the ownership 
structure of the parent company does not matter for the cost of capital of domestic 
retention finance while it matters in the case of new share issue finance (Table 1, row 
one). In the international framework this means that it does not matter for the cost of 
capital of the initial foreign equity injection and of the marginal foreign profits while it 
matters for the one of intra-marginal foreign profits, a higher home-country tax preference 
for dividends raising such a cost of capital. 
 
In all our derivations and calculations the parent’s taxable profits in the home-country are 
treated as the source of outside funding of the foreign subsidiary. Only intra-marginal 
foreign profits enjoy clear deferral benefits.   
                                                                                                                                                                  
f
SMRR19 Due to the numerical method of solving for , its reported value may be unstable.  
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Appendix: Derivation of the Real Rate of Asset Growth of a Foreign Subsidiary 
 
In general, a tax-holiday country sets, a positive corporation tax rate τf. If such a rate is 
applied to the nominal income, the rate of real asset value growth in the f-country is more 
complicated than in Estonia where, in the case of intra-marginal profits, g = MRRf prevails 
assuming the constancy of the latter. As in the main text, assume  
 
g  =  real rate of growth of the post-corporation tax asset value  
(MRRf+π)Ae(g+π)t  =  taxable nominal income at time t 
((1-τf)MRRf-τfπ)Ae(g+π)t  =  real post-corporation tax capital gain in the f-country at time t 
 
which define 
 
(A1) g = (1-τf)MRRf-τfπ
 
in the general case. Thus MRRf = g holds true for the cost of capital of financing 
investments from intra-marginal profits in Estonia. 
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Real Rate
of Return
AK
nMRR
AMRR
*
nK
*
AMRR
Investment opportunities at t=A and t=n
Required rate of return
(marginal profits)
Steady-state cost of capital
World market arbitrage eq.
Stock of capital
*
RMRR
pE −ρ
 
 
Figure 1. Expansion of investment opportunities. The shaded areas describe the 
generation and reinvestment of intra-marginal profits. 
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 Ownership structure 
            (i)                         (iii) 
Repatriation in the 
form of 
Equation  
Retention, years 
10            20 
Retention, years 
10            20  
(3) gA* 0.078 0.073 0.078 0.073 
(3) MRRAf 0.114 0.107 0.114 0.107 
Dividend 
(5) MRRRf 0.062 0.062 0.075 0.075 
Interest (2) MRRDf 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098 
(9)  τh>0 MRRSf 0,127 0,144 0,133 0,157 Capital gain / 
trade sale 
 
(9)  τh=0 MRRSf 0.099 0.112 0.100 0.119 
  
Ownership structure 
            (i)                        (iii) 
Repatriation in the 
form of 
Equation  
Retention, years 
10            20 
Retention, years 
10            20  
(3) gA* 0.078 0.073 0.078 0.073 
(3) MRRAf 0.107 0.100 0.107 0.100 
Dividend 
(5) MRRRf 0.062 0.062 0.072 0.072 
Interest (2) MRRDf 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 
(9)  τh>0 MRRSf 0.124 0.147 0.132 0.161 Capital gain / 
trade sale 
 
(9)  τh=0 MRRSf 0.098 0.114 0.100 0.122 
 
Table 2A. Required rate of asset growth and cost of capital for an Estonian subsidiary, the 
source of outside funds being the parent’s profits: upper panel inflation 2%, lower one 0% 
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 Ownership structure 
            (iia)                         (iib) 
Repatriation in the 
form of 
Equation  
Retention, years 
10            20 
Retention, years 
10            20  
(3) gA* 0.078 0.073 0.093 0.083 
(3) MRRAf 0.114 0.107 0.135 0.121 
Dividend 
(5) MRRRf 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098 
Interest (2) MRRDf 0.098 0.098 - - 
(9)  τh>0 MRRSf 0.144 0.182 - - Capital gain / 
trade sale 
 
(9)  τh=0 MRRSf 0.098 0.133 0.123 0.140 
  
Ownership structure 
            (iva)                        (ivb) 
Repatriation in the 
form of 
Equation  
Retention, years 
10            20 
Retention, years 
10            20  
(3) gA* 0.061 0.062 0.075 0.071 
(3) MRRAf 0.092 0.092 0.111 0.105 
Dividend 
(5) MRRRf 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 
Interest (1) MRRDf 0.058 0.058 - - 
(9)  τh>0 MRRSf 0.103 0.133 - - Capital gain / 
trade sale 
 
(9)  τh=0 MRRSf 0.077 0.099 0.096 0.108 
 
Table 2B. Required rate of asset growth and cost of capital for an Estonian subsidiary, the 
source of outside funds being the parent’s profits: inflation 2%. 
 23
 Ownership structure 
            (iia)                         (iib) 
Repatriation in the 
form of 
Equation  
Retention, years 
10            20 
Retention, years 
10            20  
(3) gA* 0.078 0.073 0.093 0.083 
(3) MRRAf 0.107 0.100 0.128 0.114 
Dividend 
(5) MRRRf 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 
Interest (2) MRRDf 0.089 0.089 - - 
(9)  τh>0 MRRSf 0.146 0.186 - - Capital gain / 
trade sale 
 
(9)  τh=0 MRRSf 0.100 0.137 0.124 0.144 
  
Ownership structure 
            (iva)                        (ivb) 
Repatriation in the 
form of 
Equation  
Retention, years 
10            20 
Retention, years 
10            20  
(3) gA* 0.061 0.062 0.075 0.071 
(3) MRRAf 0.085 0.085 0.104 0.098 
Dividend 
(5) MRRRf 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 
Interest (1) MRRDf 0.059 0.059 - - 
(9)  τh>0 MRRSf 0.099 0.136 - - Capital gain / 
trade sale 
 
(9)  τh=0 MRRSf 0.076 0.101 0.095 0.110 
 
Table 2C. Required rate of asset growth and cost of capital for an Estonian subsidiary, the 
source of outside funds being the parent’s profits: inflation 0%. 
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